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7	Attorneys for Plaintiff				
8	United States of America				
9	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
10	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
11	SOUTHERN DIVISION				
12	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	) Case No. SA CR 08-180-DOC			
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14	Plaintiff,	ORDER CONTINUING TRIAL DATE TO DECEMBER 4, 2012 AT 8:30 A.M. AND REGARDING EXCLUDABLE TIME PERIOD UNDER SPEEDY TRIAL ACT			
15	v. MOSES ONCIU, BEATA GIZELLA				
16	PRIORE, and IRENE PEMKOVA,	}			
17	Defendants.				
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19	The Court has read and considered the Stipulation re Excludable Time Period				
20	under Speedy Trial Act filed by the parties in this matter on January 25, 2012 and				

conducted status conferences on January 30 and February 6, 2012. At the February 6 status conference, defendants Moses Onciu, Beata Priore, and Irene Pemkova each appeared in person and stated on the record that each of them consented to the continuance requested in the Stipulation and gave up the right to be brought to trial earlier than December 4, 2012. The Court hereby finds that the Stipulation, which this Court incorporates by reference into this Order, along with the statements made at the status conferences, demonstrate facts that provide good cause for a finding of excludable time pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. 

The Court further finds that: (1) the ends of justice served by the continuance 1 outweigh the best interest of the public and defendant in a speedy trial; (2) failure to 2 grant the continuance would be likely to make a continuation of the proceeding 3 impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice; (3) failure to grant the continuance 4 would unreasonably deny defendants continuity of counsel and would deny defense 5 counsel the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the 6 exercise of due diligence, (4) this continuance results from the unavailability of an 7 essential witness, and (5) this continuance is a reasonable period of delay resulting 8 from defendants' joinder with each other for trial, the time for trial of defendants has not 9 10 run, and no motion for severance has been granted.

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THEREFORE, FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

The trial in this matter is continued from February 21, 2012 to December
4, 2012 at 8:30 a.m.

The time period of February 21, 2012 to December 4, 2012, inclusive, is excluded in computing the time within which the trial must commence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(3)(A), (h)(6), (h)(7)(A), (h)(7)(B)(I), and (B)(iv).

3. Nothing in this Order shall preclude a finding that other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act dictate that additional time periods are excluded from the period within which trial must commence. Moreover, the same provisions and/or other provisions of the Speedy Trial Act may in the future authorize the exclusion of additional time periods from the period within which trial must commence.

Dated: February 10, 2012

Awid O. Curter

Honorable David O. Carter United States District Judge

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